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Are There Lessons for the Future of News From the 2008 Presidential Campaign?
Abstract
When news does its job, attentive citizens are better able to understand both the challenges facing the
country and the competing visions of those seeking to lead it. Indeed, some argue that “the purpose of
journalism is to provide people with the information they need to be free and self-governing.” In years
past, those studying media have reliably found that consumers of traditional news were better informed
about issues of national concern. However, the growth of a new media culture in which partisans are able
to envelop themselves in like-minded content raises a question: in the world of ideologically tinged cable
news, opinion- talk radio, and viral email, does news in any of its various incarnations still sift fact from
fabrication and, in the process, heighten a voter’s knowledge about those aspiring to lead?
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Are there lessons for the future of news
from the 2008 presidential campaign?

W

hen news does its job, attentive citizens are better able to understand both
the challenges facing the country and
the competing visions of those seeking
to lead it. Indeed, some argue that “the
purpose of journalism is to provide people with the information they need to be
free and self-governing.”1 In years past,
those studying media have reliably found
that consumers of traditional news were
better informed about issues of national
concern.2 However, the growth of a new
media culture in which partisans are able
to envelop themselves in like-minded
content raises a question: in the world
of ideologically tinged cable news, opinion-talk radio, and viral email, does news
in any of its various incarnations still sift
fact from fabrication and, in the process,
heighten a voter’s knowledge about those
aspiring to lead?
Our study of the presidential general
election campaign of 2008 suggests that
traditional news sources are not the custodians of fact that they once were. At
the same time, sources that blend discussion of news with what we call opiniontalk are at least occasional purveyors of
unbalanced issue coverage and misinformation. In this transformed media envi© 2010 by the American Academy of Arts
& Sciences
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ronment, presidential debates hold up
as one of the only venues, if not the sole
source, that heightens citizens’ campaign
knowledge. These conclusions arise from
our study of how newspapers, national
and local broadcast and cable news, Internet, talk radio, and debate audiences
responded to questions about the central deceptions advanced by the major
party candidates.

I

n the general presidential election of
2008, viewers in battleground states
were assaulted by deceptive claims,
among them that Arizona Senator and
Republican Party nominee John McCain
wanted to cut Social Security and stay
in Iraq for one hundred years and that
Illinois Senator and Democratic Party
nominee Barack Obama did not take
Iran seriously and had a close relationship with former Weather Underground
leader William Ayers.3 The two most
prevalent distortions, each backed by
multimillion dollar ad buys, involved
taxation. Speci½cally, the Democrats
alleged that McCain would impose a
net tax on health care bene½ts, and
the Republicans insisted that Obama
would raise taxes on working families
including “yours.” Where the Obama
campaign spent $43 million on broadcast ads asserting the ½rst claim, the

McCain campaign devoted $53 million
to spots alleging the second.4
The Democratic nominee’s rhetoric
failed the truth test by suggesting that
the Republican would tax employer-provided health bene½ts, a statement that
sins by omission because the tax would
have been offset with a credit of $2,500
per individual or $5,000 per family. “It
could all unravel,” said one of the Obama ads. “Your health care under John
McCain. McCain would tax health bene½ts for the ½rst time ever, meaning
higher income taxes for millions.” On
the other side, McCain traf½cked in the
false conclusion that Obama planned
on raising middle-class taxes. “Times
are tough. Obama voted to raise taxes
on people making just $42,000,” noted
one McCain ad. “He promises more
taxes on small businesses, seniors, your
life savings, your family.” Obama had
forecast raising taxes, but only on those
households making over $250,000.5
Each side rebutted the false charges:
Obama in counter-advertising, debates, and speeches; McCain in the
latter two. In a moment, we will argue
that McCain’s decision not to rebut
using advertising was consequential.
An Annenberg Public Policy Center post-election survey found widespread public ignorance about the facts
underlying the nominees’ exchanges on
taxes.6 When respondents were asked
which candidate(s) they thought would
raise middle-class taxes, one in ½ve (22
percent) answered correctly that neither
planned on doing so; four in ½ve (78 percent) either did not know the answer or
answered incorrectly, including one in
six (17 percent) who embraced the deception that Obama would raise taxes. When
asked about McCain’s health care plan,
four in ten (42 percent) knew that his tax
on health care bene½ts would be offset,
while six in ten (58 percent) did not know

the correct answer, including 15 percent
of the sample that believed that bene½ts
would be taxed without the offsetting
credit.7
The questions we address here are: how
effectively did the candidates, news media, and debates blunt these central deceptions and increase audiences’ knowledge? And did embracing either of the
false beliefs affect the way people voted?

Are there
lessons
from the
2008 presidential
campaign?

Our ½rst ½nding is straightforward.

Exposure to ads increased the impact
of the deception, but only when it was
not rebutted. By counter-advertising,
Obama negated the effect of McCain’s
attack. When his campaign decided not
to do the same, McCain left audiences
vulnerable to the false inference invited
by Obama’s ads.
Because candidates most often reach
voters with ads in slots surrounding local news, news-viewing is a rough indicator of ad exposure. Further, because
local news focuses not on presidential
campaigns but, rather, on crime, sports,
and weather,8 unless the other side rebuts an attack, higher local news consumption should predict embracing the
rhetoric in the ads. Unsurprisingly then,
we ½nd that the more that people relied
on local news, the more they believed
that McCain would tax health bene½ts
without the offsetting credit, but the
less likely they were to hold that Obama would raise middle-class taxes.9
Speci½cally, those who watched local
news every day were one-and-a-half
times more prone to believe the deception about McCain than those who
watched no local news, but were 1.7
times less likely to believe the deception about Obama.
When covering politics, broadcast
and cable media tend to engage in tactical assessments and “he said/she said”
reporting, failing in the process to corDædalus Spring 2010
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rect the deceptions offered by either or
both sides.10 Consistent with this supposition, broadcast and cable news more
often than not restated the suspect allegations without challenging the misinformation they contained. This excerpt
from nbc Nightly News is illustrative:
Brian Williams: I mentioned we have
more new poll numbers tonight, and
our nbc News political director Chuck
Todd is here with those.
Chuck Todd: [. . . ] [L]ook at [his] advantages on the issues, Brian. This sort of
underscores the 10-point lead for Obama. He leads by 39 on handling health
care. He leads by 21 points on handling
the economy, by far and away the biggest
issue in [the] poll. Fourteen points on
taxes. This is happening because Obama
has been pounding McCain on the airwaves on health care and taxes, saying
he’s going to tax your health care bene½ts. And that’s why he’s got a lead now
on that. All that’s left for McCain is Iraq.11

From this segment’s focus on tactics,
audiences could learn that Obama was
advantaged by his assault on McCain’s
plan. Because the Democratic nominee’s
allegation was presented without correction, the deception was reinforced. Still,
as the following excerpt from cbs Evening News suggests, broadcast journalists
occasionally debunked the fabricated
claims:
Wyatt Andrews: John McCain wants a multitrillion-dollar tax on the middle class?
Here are the facts. Obama has the tax part
correct, but the impact on the middle class
is exaggerated. Most people will see tax
cuts. McCain does want to tax the health
insurance bene½ts that 60 million Americans now buy through their employers tax
free. However, McCain also proposes to
give the money back as a tax credit, $2,500
for individuals, $5,000 for families.12
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Although we ½nd no evidence that
watching broadcast network news increased the likelihood of embracing either deception, neither did we ½nd that
those news viewers were more likely to
know the candidates’ position on either
issue. In other words, we cannot say that
network news did any harm, but it also
did not do any good.

B

ecause partisans seek reinforcement
from like-minded media outlets, the rise
of partisan media has increased the likelihood that those of one ideological bent
will be protected from information that
might challenge their presuppositions.
The ideological dispositions of the audiences of cable news channels differ.
Those calling themselves moderates
and liberals are more likely to watch
cnn, and those wearing the conservative label are more likely to tune to fox
News. In our sample, liberals and moderates were two-and-a-half times more
prone to watch cnn as their primary
cable news channel, and conservatives
were over three-and-a-half times more
likely to watch fox News. Our survey
contained too few msnbc viewers to
permit reliable estimates for that network.
Research conducted in 2004 found
that cable news networks debunk false
claims about the candidate closer to
their ideology and embrace falsehoods
being floated about the other candidate. By so doing, conservative media
(for example, fox News and Rush Limbaugh) “create a self-protective enclave
hospitable to conservative beliefs . . .
[and enwrap audiences] in a world in
which facts supportive of Democratic
claims are contested and those consistent with conservative ones are championed.”13 Some research has found
that this pattern is characteristic of
both conservative and liberal media:

“Conservative assumptions are more
likely to go unchallenged on fox’s talk
shows than on cnn’s, and liberals are
more likely to be required to defend
their premises. The opposite is true on
cnn.”14
Contrary to the ½nding from the 2004
presidential election, in 2008 we do not
½nd a pro-Obama effect for cnn. cnn
neither increased belief in the deception
nor increased the accuracy of respondents’ answer to either issue. Similar to
network news, cnn neither did harm
nor good.
However, we do ½nd a pro-McCain
effect for fox. Speci½cally, that channel forti½ed the deception that Obama
would raise middle-class taxes. On fox,
both pundits and invited guests alleged
that the middle class had much to fear
from the Democrat at tax time.
Scott Rasmusen: But Sean, what’s happening is Barack Obama is running a great ad
campaign in battleground states. He keeps
talking about cutting taxes for 95% of
Americans. I know you’d argue about that.
Sean Hannity: It’s not true.15

In another fox piece, an invited guest
uncritically repeats the deceptive claim:
Martha MacCallum: I know that you mentioned you are fearful about an Obama
presidency because you think that this
tax–raising taxes on so many people in
this country would sort of throw a cold
blanket over this–or a wet blanket, I
should say–onto any recovery that we
might have.
Stephen Moore: [ . . . ] It’s those small businessmen who may be hiring ½ve or 10 or
20 workers, that are going to be facing a
higher income tax burden under this plan.
And this is the one question, by the way,
that Barack Obama has never been able
to answer: How do you create more jobs

for this economy if you’re levying higher
taxes on the small businesses that create
80 percent of those new jobs?16

Consistent with this analysis, watching
fox News increased the belief that Obama would raise middle-class taxes; viewers reliant on that outlet were roughly
three times more likely to believe the deception and 1.4 times less likely to know
that neither candidate proposed raising
such taxes.
Similarly, regular listeners of conservative talk radio host Rush Limbaugh
were 1.7 times more likely to believe the
deception about Obama. Like fox News,
Limbaugh reinforced deceptions about
Obama’s plans. Unlike fox, though, listeners to Rush Limbaugh were more likely–indeed, one-and-a-half times more
likely–to know the correct answer about
McCain’s health care plan.

Are there
lessons
from the
2008 presidential
campaign?

N

either the newest medium on the
scene, the Internet, nor the oldest, the
newspaper, enabled those who relied
on them to make sense of either claim.
Knowledge of the facts behind the fabrications wasn’t increased by using the
Internet for information about the presidential election or by reading major
city or national newspapers. Importantly, however, neither medium increased
audiences’ embrace of the deceptions.
Put simply, these two outlets also neither helped voters nor harmed them.
Our ½ndings up to this point are disappointing. The news media did not
serve as effective custodians of fact in
2008; instead, some outlets performed
a function one would expect of campaign surrogates. However, the citizen
seeking political substance did have a
recourse. For almost ½ve decades, studies have con½rmed the power of presidential debates to increase voter knowledge,17 and 2008 was no exception.
Dædalus Spring 2010
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The debates’ two-sided clash of competing ideas, unmediated by interpretation from reporters, spiked voter knowledge. In these often disparaged encounters, the presidential and vice presidential nominees took on the deceptions
perpetrated by the other side, including
those on health care and taxing proposals. On no fewer than ten occasions
across three debates, Barack Obama
insisted either that he would not raise
taxes on households making less than
$250,000 a year or that 95 percent of
Americans would get a tax cut. When
McCain made the charge, Obama responded:
John McCain: Senator Obama’s secret that
you don’t know is that his tax increases
will increase taxes on 50 percent of small
business revenue. . . . I’ve got some news,
Senator Obama, the news is bad. So let’s
not raise anybody’s taxes, my friends, and
make it be very clear that I am not in favor
of tax cuts for the wealthy. I am in favor of
leaving the tax rates alone and reducing
the tax burden of middle-income Americans.
Barack Obama: [ . . . ] [L]et’s be clear about
my tax plan and Senator McCain’s. . . . I
want to provide a tax cut for 95 percent of
Americans, 95 percent. If you make less
than a quarter of a million dollars a year,
you will not see a single dime of your taxes go up. If you make $200,000 a year or
less, your taxes will go down. Now, Senator McCain talks about small businesses.
Only a few percent of small businesses
make more than $250,000 a year. So the
vast majority of small businesses would
get a tax cut under my plan.18

The debates afforded McCain the same
opportunity. So, for example, the third
debate included this exchange:
Barack Obama: Here’s the problem–that
for about 20 million people, you may ½nd
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yourselves no longer having employerbased health insurance [with Senator McCain’s plan]. . . . And once you’re out on
your own with this $5,000 credit, Senator
McCain, for the ½rst time, is going to be
taxing the health care bene½ts that you
have from your employer. And this is
your plan, John. For the ½rst time in history, you will be taxing people’s health
care bene½ts.
John McCain: [ . . . ] Now, 95 percent of
the people in America will receive more
money under my plan because they will
receive not only their present bene½ts,
which may be taxed, which will be taxed,
but then you add $5,000 onto it.19

As this Obama example illustrates,
the candidates were occasionally more
accurate in characterizing their opponents’ plans in the debates than they
were in ads. Still, the Arizona senator
regularly suggested that the Democratic nominee would raise taxes, especially on small businesses while he supported “reducing the tax burden” of
the middle class. At the same time, his
Illinois counterpart repeatedly implied
that McCain’s health care plan would
raise taxes on many.
However, because each side had the opportunity to correct the other’s misstatements, watching the debates increased
knowledge. In the presence of a robust
list of controls, including political ideology, party identi½cation, political knowledge, and news consumption, those who
tuned into all four debates were one-anda-half times less likely than non-viewers to believe the deception that Obama
would raise middle-class taxes, and were
one-and-a-half times more likely to know
that neither candidate had proposed upping them on the middle-class. Those
who watched all four debates were not
only not more likely to believe Obama’s
deception about McCain, but were 3.8

times more likely than non-viewers to
know that a credit would offset the tax.
All of this matters because, even in
the presence of a robust list of controls,
being misled about these issues affected vote choice.20 Voters who were convinced that McCain would impose a net
tax on health care bene½ts were 2.8 times
more likely to cast their ballot for Obama. Similarly, those who believed that
Obama would raise middle-class taxes
were 7.8 times more likely to vote for
McCain. To calibrate the importance
of these ½ndings, note that embracing
deception is almost as strong a predictor of vote as party identi½cation.21
When they reinforced deceptions,
news outlets had the same distorting
effect on voting behavior.
In short, with the exception of Rush
Limbaugh’s correction of distortions
of McCain’s health care plan, other media we studied failed to increase citizens’
understanding of the facts underlying
the charges and counter-charges from
the campaigns. In some cases, news exposure actually magni½ed belief in a deception: viewers of fox and listeners
to Rush Limbaugh were more likely to
endorse McCain’s contortion of Obama’s position. Candidate advertising
was successful in correcting misstatements by the other side. However, the
hero in our story is not a traditional
news outlet, a partisan news source, or
paid advertising. It was not reliance on
any of these sources, but rather viewing
presidential debates that increased voter knowledge and undercut the power
of the deceptions from both sides.

Still, the new media environment car-

ries with it an increased capacity to locate accurate campaign information.
In 2008, the St. Petersburg Times added
PolitiFact to a menu of existing sources
dedicated to making politicians account-

able for their assertions. Similarly, The
Washington Post’s Michael Dobbs regularly unmasked the deceptions in candidate ads. And FactCheck.org (run by the
Annenberg Public Policy Center) continued to play the role it introduced in the
2004 election.22
All three sites devoted space to challenging distortions in broadcast and
cable advertising and suspect content
in cyberspace. Of course, the disposition of news outlets to replicate the effort of these sites is dampened by a
commercial environment in which onenewspaper towns are giving way to nonewspaper towns; surviving news outlets are laying off staff; and audiences
for traditional news are scattering to
a wide range of alternative sources.23
Although we assume that exposure to
sites debunking fabrication will increase
knowledge, our survey contained too
few respondents to test that hypothesis.

Are there
lessons
from the
2008 presidential
campaign?

I

n his 1805 inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson expressed con½dence that
“[t]he public judgment will correct
false reasoning and opinions on a full
hearing of all parties.”24 In 2008, news
failed to help the public perform the role
Jefferson envisioned for it, and citizens
did not live up to the expectations Jefferson set for them either. Still, the debates
served the public well.
As the audience for traditional news
erodes, as cable and websites proliferate,
and as audiences increasingly gravitate
to sources that reinforce their beliefs,
the concerns that Jefferson’s statement
invites raise at least three questions. To
what sources can the public turn in order to gain a “full hearing of all parties”?
How does a democracy motivate citizens
to select such sources? And, ½nally, are
there alternative ways in which “public
judgment” can be adequately informed?
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